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The Normalization of Exclusion through a Revival of Whiteness in 
Donald Trump's 2016 Election Campaign Discourse 
This article is based on the thesis that the language employed during the Trump 
campaign and the narrative created in his public speeches and social media posts 
played a decisive role in increasing white voter turnout and thus contributed to a 
significant extent to Trump’s victory. I argue that Trump won the presidency not 
despite having run what the Washington Post called "the most racist, xenophobic, 
misogynistic campaign for president in memory,” but because of it. The often 
openly abusive, hateful, and nativist discourse of the Trump campaign is the 
result of a strategic decision to create a winning coalition, a new, old covenant, of 
white Americans eager to reinstate a vision of a pre-diversity America. In his 
campaign speeches, Trump employed a number of discursive strategies that 
supported the normalization of verbal behavior that was previously seen as either 
utterly unacceptable or at least politically incorrect. These include, among others, 
the creation of fear, racialization, discrimination, stigmatization and de-
stigmatization, scapegoating and victimization, as well as othering and social 
exclusion. All of these strategies need to be seen against the background of 
discursively constructed imaginaries of whiteness where the exclusion of un-
American others in Trump's campaign discourse is closely linked with an 
articulation of America as a white nation. 
Keywords: American jeremiad; campaign discourse; Donald J. Trump; 
normalization; othering; political correctness; whiteness 
1 Introduction 
On June 16, 2015, Donald J. Trump announced his intention to run for the office of 
President of the United States. Speaking in the lavish lobby of Trump Tower on New 
York's Fifth Avenue, the reality-TV star and billionaire real-estate mogul gave the 
public a first glimpse at how he intended to "Make American Great Again," and a first 
taste of the language he intended to use in his ultimately successful campaign. As the 
Guardian newspaper writes, Trump "had been waging what many saw as a racist 
'birther' campaign against Barack Obama for years, falsely claiming the then president 
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had been born in Kenya. But even for close Trump watchers, the speech represented 
new extremes" (Gabbatt 2019). Within less than two minutes into his speech, Trump 
claimed that 
When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending 
you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those 
problems with them. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're 
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. (Announcement) 
Verbal attacks on immigrants and foreigners became a staple of Trump's America First 
discourse, which established a causal relationship between illegal immigration and 
violent crimes and conjured up the threatening image of "millions more illegal 
immigrants; thousands of more violent, horrible crimes; and total chaos and 
lawlessness" (Immigration). 
If we understand normalization as the strategic use of "language which 
pre/legitimises views, ideologies and positions that were until recently treated as radical 
and socially unacceptable" (Krzyżanowski 2020, 1), then Trumps' campaign speeches 
warrant particular scrutiny.  
This article is based on the thesis that the language employed during the Trump 
campaign and the narrative created in his public speeches and social media posts played 
a decisive role in increasing white voter turnout and thus contributed to a significant 
extent to Trump's victory. In this context, the normalization of previously unacceptable 
discursive behavior played a significant role. I will further argue that Trump won the 
presidency not despite having run what the Washington Post called "the most racist, 
xenophobic, misogynistic campaign for president in memory" (Capehart 2017), but 
because of it. The often openly abusive, hateful, and nativist discourse of the Trump 
campaign was the result of a strategic decision to create a winning coalition, a new, old 
covenant of white Americans eager to reinstate a largely imaginary vision of a pre-
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diversity America. By tapping into a deep well of existing prejudice and fear, Trump's 
exclusionary discourse created an in-group united as much by economic resentment as 
by cultural anxieties.  
One of the pillars of the success of Trump's discourse was his ability to capture 
the needs of a community of 'American sufferers' and first feed, through a language of 
fear, their existing social, cultural, and economic anxieties, and then transform the latter 
into anger and political action. This in-group—the demographic backbone of Trump's 
electoral college victory—proved particularly susceptible to the nativist and anti-elitist 
message of Trump's campaign discourse and was overwhelmingly composed of white 
Americans, in particular, but not exclusively, non-college educated whites, both male 
and female.  
Trump laid the blame for the nation's troublesome state at the feet of the 
country's governing economic, political, and media elites. This scapegoating technique 
did not only absolve Trump voters from any potential blame for their own situation but 
also gave them a target in the form of Hillary Clinton that they could focus their anger 
on. By portraying Americans as victims of a global conspiracy and treason at the 
highest levels of the American political establishment, Trump victimized his voters and 
converted their anxieties into political motivation.  
Trump employed a number of discursive strategies that supported the 
normalization of verbal behavior that had previously been considered either utterly 
unacceptable or at least politically incorrect. These include, among others, the creation 
of fear, racialization, discrimination, stigmatization and de-stigmatization, scapegoating 
and victimization, as well as othering and social exclusion. All of these strategies need 
to be seen against the background of discursively constructed imaginaries of whiteness. 
The exclusion of un-American others is closely linked with an articulation of America 
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as a white nation. Here, Trump's announcement speech represents a turning point in 
political campaign discourse and the beginning of the end of discursive decency. As 
Burleigh (2019) states, "by declaring Mexican immigrants 'rapists' on the first day of his 
campaign, he promoted an us-vs.-them worldview and found a political vein other 
politicians had not dared tap—or, if they had, only gingerly: whiteness." 
As I discuss in greater detail elsewhere (Austermuehl 2019), Trump framed his 
ethno-nativist vision of America and his attacks on the anti-white establishment almost 
entirely, and very consistently, in the form of the American jeremiad (Bercovitch 2012), 
a type of political and religious discourse that arrived in America with the first Puritan 
pilgrims. Adopting the logic of the jeremiad allows candidates to don the mantle of the 
political prophet who laments the nation's tribulations, blames the current leaders for the 
nation's sorrow state, absolves the people of any blame for their troubles, and offers 
himself as the solution to all the problems. Understanding the cultural tradition of the 
jeremiad and its recontexualization in modern U.S. presidential campaigns is key to 
understanding how normalization happens, i.e., how Trump's deliberate and strategic 
use of language not only "disrupted political and discourse norms" (Jamieson and 
Taussig 2017, 649) but also enabled him to "present[] 'uncivil' ideas related to 
unacceptable norms of social conduct – such as e.g. racism, discrimination etc. – as 
legitimate and acceptable (Krzyżanowski 2020, 11). 
In the following, I will first provide some context regarding the 2016 election, 
focusing, in particular, on voter turnout rates and candidate preferences by race and 
class. Following this, I will discuss the methodology supporting this study and then 
analyze the main normalization strategies evident in Trump's campaign discourse 
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strategies against the background of the American jeremiad.1 I will conclude with an 
outlook to the 2020 U.S. presidential election campaign. 
2 America's "First White President" 
Explaining why exactly Trump ended up winning the 2016 election is not a simple task. 
Reasons why Trump did much better than expected, and why his opponent Hillary 
Clinton was not able to sustain her leads in pre-election opinion polls, are plentiful, 
starting with the poor quality of the opinion polls themselves (Kennedy et al. 2018), and 
continuing, among many others, with Trump's focus on traditional Republican themes, 
such as taxes, military spending, gun laws, and abortion (Hanson 2016), Clinton's 
lackluster campaigning (Stein 2017), the FBI's investigation into Clinton's misuse of 
private e-mail (McElwee, McDermott, and Jordan 2017), Russian meddling (Lichtblau 
2017), and more restrictive voter registration laws that discriminated against black 
voters (Newkirk 2018).  
Nevertheless, in an election effectively decided by 77,744 votes—i.e., the 
combined winning margin for the three states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin that gave Trump the majority in the Electoral College—it is safe to assume 
that superior turnout among Trump voters, in particular among rural and working-class 
whites, and the sizeable group of white Obama-to-Trump voters are at the core of 
Trump's victory. Increasing voter turnout is no small task; indeed, it represents, as 
Newsweek magazine puts it, "the Holy Grail" of political campaigning (Goodman 
2014).  
                                                 
1 While, at times, I will refer to Trump's use of Twitter, this analysis is primarily based on 
formal campaign speeches (see Section 3 for details on the corpus used). For Trump and 
Twitter, see Smith and Higgins 2020. 
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Understanding how Trump managed to ensure that the members of the 
demographic group that constituted the vast majority of his voters, i.e., white men and 
women, often without a college degree, often belonging to the rural and working classes 
of America, showed up on Election Day and voted for him is crucial not only to 
explaining Trump victory in 2016 but also to what kind of campaign we can expect for 
the 2020 U.S. presidential elections. 
Overall, the 2016 turnout was "not statistically different from the 61.8 percent 
who reported voting in 2012." However, when considering voters' race and taking a 
more diachronic perspective, a different picture emerges. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, "voting rates have historically varied by race and Hispanic origin. In 2012, 
voting rates for non-Hispanic blacks (66.6 percent) were higher than non-Hispanic 
whites (64.1 percent) for the first time [since 2000]. In 2016, turnout increased to 65.3 
percent for non-Hispanic whites, but decreased to 59.6 percent for non-Hispanic blacks" 
(File 2017, 1).  
The consequences of the decline in the numbers of voters that formed Obama's 
winning rainbow coalition (and of which Clinton won a smaller share than Obama) is 
intensified by parallel increases in the number of members of Trump's white coalition. 
The writer Ta-Nehisi Coates summed up the importance of white voter by referring to 
Trump as "America's first white president." As Coates explains, "in 2016, Trump 
enjoyed majority or plurality support among every economic branch of whites. Trump 
won white voters with and without a college degree. He won both white men (63 
percent) and women (53 percent) [...] and all age groups of whites" (Coates 2017). The 
only group of white voters that Trump did not win were college-educated women, who 
made up about 20 per cent of the total vote and favored Clinton by 51 per cent over 44 
per cent. Overall, though, Clinton, the first female major-party candidate for president 
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"was not broadly more appealing to women than previous Democrats. And, in fact, she 
did worse with noncollege white women than a black man did four years earlier" 
(Yglesias 2017). 
The size of the advantage of Trump's victory among white voters was 
significant, including in the rust belt swing states that secured Trump's electoral college 
victory. "Turnout for Pennsylvania's white voters went up significantly; white college 
graduate turnout was up 3 points and white non-college-graduate turnout was up more 
than 4 points" (Griffin, Teixeira, and Halpin 2017, 9). In Wisconsin, white voter turnout 
dropped by about two per cent, but was eclipsed by a 19-point drop in black voter 
turnout (11). 
A total of five million white voters, i.e., 12.7 per cent of all white voters who 
supported Obama in 2012 voted for Trump in 2016. These Obama-Trump voters "were 
disproportionately white and members of the working class." In addition, "eligible 
nonvoters in 2012 were also a substantial portion of Trump's voters in 2016, and they 
were disproportionately white" (Morgan and Lee 2018, 238). 
In the aftermath of the 2016 election, a number of political commentators 
pointed to Trump's ability to "activate" white voters as having been essential to his 
narrow victory. Newsweek journalist Nina Burleigh (2018) wrote, "Trump, with his 
pledge to "make America great again," activated the equivalent of a political sleeper 
cell. Not surprisingly, the data finds a strong correlation between "white identity" and 
support for the candidate in the red MAGA hat." 
3 Methodology 
The following analysis of how Trump's discourse in general and his use of a set of 
normalization strategies in particular contributed to his electoral success is informed by 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and its interest in the construction of identities and 
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the establishment of political power relationships (see, for example, Fairclough 1992 
and van Dijk 2008). The study also relies on Corpus Linguistics (CL) and is both 
corpus-based and corpus-driven, combining quantitative and qualitative forms of 
computer-assisted analysis with the close reading of selected campaign speeches (see 
Baker et al. 2008).  
The analysis of Trump's campaign discourse and the strategies of normalization 
applied is based on two corpora, which are used in a complementary manner. In line 
with the combined CL-CDA approach mentioned above, the critical analysis of Trump's 
discourse is based on an in-depth study of nine major campaign speeches (including the 
Inaugural Address; see Appendix 1). The total number of words in this corpus is 35,211. 
The selected speeches in the first corpus reflect the normal life cycle of presidential 
campaigns in the United States. The official beginning of the campaign comes in the 
form of the candidacy announcement. The nomination acceptance speech, delivered 
during the Republican National Convention, represents the climax of the primary 
election season and, at the same time, serves as the official opening of the general 
election campaign. The victory speech completes the election process and signifies the 
beginning of the transition period. The inaugural address, finally, completes the 
campaign and intends to re-unite the populace (Campbell and Jamieson 2008). 
The remaining five speeches in the close-reading sub-corpus were selected due 
to their temporal coverage of the entire election cycle, their respective lengths, the main 
topics they covered, and the amount of media coverage they created. They can all be 
considered as substantial and impactful campaign speeches. The nine speeches in this 
corpus will be referred to by their (shortened) title. 
The second corpus consists of 74 speeches (including eight of the speeches 
mentioned above, but excluding the inaugural address; see Appendix 2) given by Trump 
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during the 2016 primary and general election campaigns, starting with his candidacy 
announcement of June 2015 and ending with the victory speech in the early hours of 
November 9, 2016. The total number of words in this corpus is 230,764. The speeches 
in this corpus will be referred to by the place and date they were given. The texts of all 
speeches are taken from the University of California at Santa Barbara's American 
Presidency Project website (https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu). 
The computer-assisted analysis of the larger corpus—aimed at complementing 
the critical analysis of the smaller corpus—focuses on the identification of specific 
linguistic patterns and their related normalization strategies through the analysis of, e.g., 
collocations and word clusters (n-grams) of selected keywords, such as, e.g., "kill," 
"murder," "immigrant(s)" or "worker(s)."  
In line with my previous interpretation of Trump's campaign discourse as a 
recontextualized jeremiad, I will structure the presentation and discussion of the results 
of the corpus analysis according to the narrative logic of the jeremiad, merging the latter 
with a description of the normalization logic inherent to Trump's discourse. 
4 Normalizing Bigotry: The Uncivil Discourse of Donald Jeremiah 
Trump 
As I discuss in greater detail elsewhere (Austermuehl 2019), Trump framed his ethno-
nativist vision of America and his attacks on the anti-white establishment almost 
entirely, and very consistently, in the form of the American jeremiad, a type of political 
and religious discourse that arrived in America with the first Puritan pilgrims. Seeing 
Trump's normalization discourse through the lens of the American jeremiad will add an 
important historical dimension to the analysis of his discourse and will also help 
understanding why this genre is particular suitable for employing what Krzyżanowski 
and Ledin (2017) call "borderline discourses." 
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The jeremiad takes its name from the prophet Jeremiah, who preached against 
greedy priests and false prophets, who catalogued Israel's fall from fidelity and warned 
of the horrible judgments to come. In the early days of the New England colonies, 
jeremiads were often employed in reaction to some sort of crisis, e.g., a drought, a fire, 
or an Indian attack. Puritan church leaders used passages from the Book of Jeremiah or 
his Book of Lamentations to present these tribulations as God's punishment for moral 
problems in their community, and then called for repentance and the renewal of the 
group’s original covenant with God. This is backed by a promise that God would not 
forsake them if they returned to him.  
Over time, the jeremiad developed into a kind of rhetorical Swiss-army knife 
applied in such diverse contexts as the anti-slavery movement, women's voting rights, 
the prohibition, the Civil rights struggle, and political election campaigns. By 
employing the jeremiad as an “indictment” (Kaveny 2016), Trump was able to 
successfully tap into the conscious and subconscious experiences of American voters, 
simultaneously 1) lamenting the current disastrous economic and emotional state of a 
country under siege at home and ridiculed abroad; 2) laying the blame for this 
''American carnage" (Inaugural) on a cabal of un-American others (Mexican rapists, 
Islamic terrorists, treacherous special interests, treasonous politicians, stupid leaders, a 
lying secretary of state, etc.); 3) establishing himself as the ultimate political outsider, a 
new American Cincinnatus, as the successful, strong businessman, the male protector of 
the true American people; and thus 4) presenting himself as the only solution—("I alone 
can fix this")—to the tribulations that his people, misled by the false prophets of past 
administrations, are experiencing. 
The steps of the jeremiad are closely aligned with and supported by a number of 
normalization strategies. The description of the tribulations afflicting the nation aims at 
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the creation of physical and economic fear (see Wodak 2015) and an overall sense of 
"moral panic" (see Cohen 1972/2002 and Krzyżanowski 2020). The fear mongering is 
often accompanied by the use of racialized, discriminatory language, which is also 
present during the jeremiad's second stage, where the prophet identifies and condemns 
the scapegoats who are to be blamed for the nation's problems. The description of these 
scapegoats is full of stereotypes and stigmata, while the 'true' people, the prophet's 
future voters, are victimized, destigmatized, and generally absolved of any blame for the 
circumstances in which they find themselves. The scapegoating ultimately leads to the 
creation of in-groups and out-groups and to the social exclusion of those not belonging 
to the in-group of the chosen people. The prophet's self-portrait as a political outsider is 
supported by claims of authenticity, which is evidenced by the use of plain language.  
4.1 American Wasteland 
The first step of the campaign jeremiad consists in listing and describing in great and 
vivid detail the troubles that the nation is currently facing. From the onset, Trump 
makes clear that the stakes are high, telling the Republican National Convention that 
"we meet at a moment of crisis for our nation. The attacks on our police, and the 
terrorism in our cities, threaten our very way of life" (Nomination Acceptance) and 
proclaiming "a struggle for the survival of our nation" (West Palm Beach).  
Trump organizes his utterly negative narrative of the state of the American 
nation around two realms, the domestic and the international. Domestically, he conjures 
up the image of an American wasteland, a dystopian landscape of industrial ruins, 
rusted machines, soulless cities, and dysfunctional communities, recalling images of the 
Great Depression with its dustbowls and food lines. 
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Mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities; rusted-out factories 
scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our Nation; an education system, 
flush with cash, but which leaves our young and beautiful students deprived of all 
knowledge; and the crime and the gangs and the drugs that have stolen too many 
lives and robbed our country of so much unrealized potential. (Inaugural) 
This post-apocalyptic landscape is dominated by lawlessness, where police officers are 
under attack and the whole nation is threatened by marauding gangs of killers 
terrorizing America's main street.  
America was shocked to its core when our police officers in Dallas were so 
brutally executed. […] Law officers have been shot or killed in recent days in 
Georgia, Missouri, Wisconsin, Kansas, Michigan and Tennessee. […] On Sunday, 
more police were gunned down in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. […] Thousands of 
criminal aliens [that] freely roam our streets, do whatever they want to do, crime 
all over the place. (Nomination Acceptance) 
In Trump's discourse, the American body itself is under assault. America is being 
“poisoned,” “crippled,” “gutted,” “raped,” and the threat to America is everywhere: 
ISIS has spread across the […] world. Libya is in ruins, and our Ambassador and 
his staff were left helpless to die at the hands of savage killers […]. Iraq is in 
chaos. Iran is on the path to nuclear weapons. Syria is engulfed in a civil war and a 
refugee crisis now threatens the West. (Nomination Acceptance) 
But it is not enough that America is facing an existential threat from Mexican rapists 
and ISIS killers. No, it is also becoming a nation of losers. "America can't win 
anymore," says Trump, more than once. America is becoming a third world country, 
and worse: "That's when we become Greece. That's when we become a country that's 
unsalvageable" (Announcement). America is being humiliated and ridiculed around the 
world, and its unpatriotic president and his Secretary of State are allowing it to happen. 
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The degree of deviance from previous discursive norms in Trump's campaign 
speeches becomes apparent when seen in comparison to the previous Republican 
candidate, Mitt Romney. In 2012, Romney, who was running on what at the time was 
considered a hardline immigration policy, told members of the Republican National 
Hispanic Assembly in Tampa, Florida, that "we must address illegal immigration in a 
way that is civil but resolute." Adding, "Our country must do a better job of securing its 
borders," Romney promised, long before Trump, the "construction of a high-tech fence, 
and investing in adequate manpower and resources" among the Mexican border. 
Romney attacked Obama as having failed "to address the problems of illegal 
immigration in America" ((Romney 2011), but he never called the President a traitor. 
Indeed, in the 100 documents covering Romney's 2012 campaign available on the 
University of California at Santa Barbara's American Presidency Project website, 
Romney never uses the word "traitor" or, for that matter, the words "rape" or "rapist(s)", 
once. Trump uses "traitor(s)" six times to refer to Clinton and/or Obama and refers to 
"rape" and "rapists" in the context of illegal immigration 15 times in a total of 74 
analyzed speeches.  
Trump's language of fear is very much relying on the use of negatively charged 
lexical items. A frequency analysis of the keyword stems 'kill*' and 'murder*,' for 
example, shows the strong presence of these so-called "devil terms" (Weaver 1953). 
The words 'kill*' or 'murder*' appear in 57 of the 74 speeches analyzed for a total of 226 
occurrences. The three most frequent collocates, i.e., words in the immediate textual 
vicinity of kill* or murder*, are 'immigrant,' 'illegal,' and 'gang,' which underlines the 
highly stigmatized narrative of fear in Trump's discourse. 
The logic inherent to this approach becomes even more visible when we analyze 
the occurrence of the keywords 'immigrant' and 'immigrants' in Trump's campaign 
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corpus. These words appear 141 times in the corpus and are concentrated in 39 
speeches. In 102 cases, 'immigrant*' is preceded by the adjective 'illegal.' The second 
and third most frequent collocators for immigrant* are 'deported' and 'criminal,' 
followed by 'killed' ("by an illegal immigrant"). The fourth most frequent collocator is 
the word "children." Children are being used in only two ways in the context of 
immigrants. Either they are the victims of illegal immigrants—Trumps refers, e.g., to 
"the plight of Americans who have lost their children to illegal immigrants" (Jackson, 
MS, Aug. 24, 2016)—or they are children of Muslim immigrants and as such terrorists. 
On a number of occasions, Trump claims that "already, hundreds of recent immigrants 
and their children have been convicted of terrorist activity inside the U.S." (SoHo). 
Another frequent word in the vicinity of 'immigrant*' is 'Obamacare.' Here, 
Trump uses the alleged abuse of the Affordable Care Act by illegal immigrants as a way 
to stir up the resentment of those Americans who see themselves as playing by the rules 
but who are overtaken by those who abuse the system and by the politicians enabling 
such abuse. Trump uses the exact same phrase—"Obamacare for illegal immigrants"—
in five different speeches, saying, for example:  
[Hillary Clinton] wants Social Security, Medicare and lifetime welfare for illegal 
immigrants by making them all citizens. They get taken care of better than our 
great vets […]. She wants Obamacare for illegal immigrants. Obamacare is not 
going to be here much longer, folks. You see what's going on. Regardless. No 
deportation of Visa overstays. Expanding catch-and-release on the border. 
(Colorado Spring, Co., Oct. 18, 2016; emphasis mine) 
This quote reflects the dangerous genius in Trump's speeches. He manages to start with 
serving his constituency one piece of political 'red meat' (here, illegal immigrants) but 
then immediately piles on other highly charged topics such as leniency towards felons, 
disregard of law and order, and disrespect of veterans of the Armed Forces. He 
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establishes causality where none exists, and laces his statements with just enough 
examples of selected, individual cases to suggest a greater, more universal truth. 
By attacking immigrants for allegedly taking advantage of the system, while 
never mentioning immigrants in a positive context, Trump enforces the stereotypical 
views held by a large part of the American white working class, who resent these "line 
cutters" (Hochschild 2016). Trump fully embraces both the pride and the plight of white 
working-class Americans. By blaming the perceived deteriorating economic 
circumstances of American workers on deceitful foreign elements enabled by the 
globalists of the current administration, Trump satisfies deep-seated racial stereotypes 
and absolves American workers for any mistakes of their own and thus strengthens 
socially exclusionary tendencies among white voters. By promising to put America 
First, Trump offers a nativist solution to the challenges of an increasingly diverse, post-
industrial society. He uses the expression "America first" 74 times in 42 speeches (total 
number of speeches in corpus: 74) and places the American worker at the heart of his 
narrative. Trump explicitly refers to "worker(s)" 184 times in 57 of the 74 speeches 
analyzed. Interestingly, Trump only starts using the expression "American worker(s)" in 
his campaign speeches in late August 2016, but then does so very consistently (58 times 
in 32 speeches).  
In the last two months of the election campaign, Trump's America First slogan 
and his focus on the American worker merge into a pledge to "put American workers 
first" and the promise that "American workers will be hired to do the job." Within the 
span of 18 days (Sept. 13 to Sept. 30, 2016), Trump uses this exact same sentence in 
eleven different speeches. In almost all these instances, the "American workers will be 
hired to do the job" mantra is embedded in a larger, nationalist narrative promising the 
rightful return of prosperity to God's chosen people: 
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We will rebuild our roads, bridges, tunnels, highways, airports, schools and 
hospitals. // American cars will travel the roads, American planes will soar in the 
skies, and American ships will patrol the seas. // American steel will send new 
skyscrapers into the clouds. // American hands will rebuild this nation – and 
American energy, harvested from American sources, will power this nation. 
American workers will be hired to do the job. // We will put new American steel 
into the spine of this country. // I will fight for every neglected part of this nation – 
and I will fight to bring us all together as Americans. // Imagine what our country 
could accomplish if we started working together as One People, under One God, 
saluting One American Flag. (New York, Sept. 15, 2016; emphasis mine) 
This description of this American utopia—a rare element in Trump's otherwise 
dystopian campaign discourse—reminds Americans of the nation's Golden Age of the 
1950s and 1960s, eliciting memories of a time when the American heartland was 
thriving economically and culturally.  
Trump proposes a simple solution to the alleged threats to the heartland 
originating from alien criminals and terrorists: the erection and strengthening of 
physical boundaries. First, on the country's southern border, "a great wall," "an 
impenetrable, physical, tall, power[ful], beautiful" (Immigration) wall will stem the tide 
of rapists and drugs, that "will not only keep out dangerous cartels and criminals, but it 
will also keep out the drugs and heroin poisoning our youth" (Bangor, ME, Oct. 15, 
2016). Second, Trump promises "to keep radical Islamic terrorists the hell out of our 
country" (Manchester, NH, Oct. 28, 2016) by "suspend[ing] immigration from areas of 
the world when there is a proven history of terrorism against the United States, Europe 
or our allies." Trump continues, "the ban will be lifted when we as a nation are in a 
position to properly and perfectly screen those people coming into our country" 
(Manchester, NH, June 13, 2016). In a speech on immigration in Phoenix, Trump refers 
to this screening of immigrants as a "vetting mechanism," saying: "I call it extreme 
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vetting right? Extreme vetting. I want extreme. It's going to be so tough, and if 
somebody comes in that's fine but they're going to be good. It's extreme" (Immigration). 
The creation of physical barriers aimed at keeping those who threaten "not only 
our security but our way of life" out (Manchester, NH, June 13, 2016) is one of the 
cornerstones of Trump's campaign. But the American heartland is threatened not only 
by invasive alien others but by homemade enemies of the American way of life as 
Trump and his supporters understand it. First in line are those not respecting the law. 
Using the exact same line—"There is no compassion in tolerating lawless conduct. 
Crime and violence is an attack on the poor, and will never be accepted in a Trump 
Administration"—in two different speeches (South Bend, WI, Aug. 16, 2016, and 
Pittsburgh, PA, September 22, 2016), Trump condemns te riots in Milwaukee and 
Charlotte, linking them to an overall "anti-police atmosphere" created by the Obama-
Clinton administration. Never mentioning the black victims of the incidents that started 
the riots, Trump calls the riots "an assault on the right of all citizens to live in security 
and peace" and identifies "law-abiding African-American citizens" as the "main 
victims," adding, "It is their jobs, their homes, their schools and communities which will 
suffer as a result" (West Bend, WI, Aug. 16, 2016). 
By depicting black urban communities as lawless territories and African-
Americans as in need of protection from themselves, Trump taps into deep-seated 
stereotypes of black-on-black violence, black poverty, and black hopelessness. 
Repeatedly referring to Detroit and Chicago, cities besieged by an "epidemic of 
violence," Trump makes the most cynical of pitches to African-American voters:  
I'm going to make it my personal mission to bring opportunity, safety and 
prosperity to our very, very troubled inner cities. […] To those hurting and 
suffering and left behind, I say, what do you have to lose by trying something new? 
What do you have to lose by voting for Donald Trump for president? What do you 
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have to lose? I will fix the problem. I will fix the problem. (Virginia Beach, VA, 
July 11, 2016) 
The questions "What do you have to lose?" and "What the hell do you have to lose?" 
appear in 27 of the 74 campaign speeches analyzed. A day before the election, and 
speaking, as usual, to an almost exclusively white audience, Trump asks: "So you live 
in the inner cities. You're African-American. You're Hispanic. The schools are no good. 
There are no jobs. And it's totally unsafe. And I say I will fix it. What the hell do you 
have to lose? I'm going to fix it" (Raleigh, NC, Nov. 7, 2016). 
Trump's apparent concern for the economic and physical security of Hispanic 
and black voters is a thinly-veiled, Nixonesque appeal to the "silent majority" (Phoenix, 
AZ, Oct. 29, 2016) of Americans looking for law and order to be restored in America. 
Trump's nomination acceptance speech plays a central role in this narrative. Here, 
Trump stresses the lawlessness plaguing the nation, stating, "Americans watching this 
address tonight have seen the recent images of violence in our streets and the chaos in 
our communities. Many have witnessed this violence personally, some have even been 
its victims." Trump identifies attacks on police officers as archetypal of un-American 
behavior—"An attack on law enforcement is an attack on all Americans"—and 
establishes himself as the sole protector of America's rule of law, stating: "In this race 
for the White House, I am the law and order candidate." In Trump's discourse, appeals 
for law and order are always tied to economic benefits. The dialectic is clear: "My plan 
will begin with safety at home–which means safe neighborhoods, secure borders, and 
protection from terrorism. There can be no prosperity without law and order" 
(Nomination Acceptance). 
4.2 The System is Rigged 
Finding a scapegoat for the fact that "the American dream is dead" (Announcement), 
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represents the second stage of the jeremiad. By identifying illegal immigrants, Muslim 
terrorists, and evil foreign empires on the one hand and lawless black Americans on the 
other hand as two threats to America's physical and economic security and to the 
nation's very own way of life, Trump has created one of two un-American out-groups 
that he makes responsible for the nation's decay and for the poor state of the members of 
the white Trump coalition. But they are not the real culprits, for there is a second, even 
more vicious group that enables the savages of the first group to rape the America 
nation and that is to be blamed for the tribulations of the in-group.  
This part of the narrative is identity politics par excellence, and it is here where 
Trump is at his ruthless best, unleashing nothing less than a cultural civil war. Trump 
leaves no doubt as to who the false prophets are that have caused America's downfall. 
Americans have been betrayed by their own leaders, by the politicians, and their elitist 
puppet masters. They are the victims of a corrupt system that is "rigged by big 
businesses who want to leave our country, fire our workers […] with absolutely no 
consequences for them" (SoHo), a government controlled by special interests who 
"have total control over every single thing [Hillary Clinton] does. She is their puppet, 
and they pull the strings" (Nomination Acceptance). Trump's anti-elite discourse 
portrays the country's current leaders as not only stupid and incompetent but also as 
traitors, claiming that "President Obama has treated Iran with tender love and care and 
made it a great power" (Foreign Policy) and that [Hillary Clinton] sold out our workers, 
and our country, for Beijing" (SoHo). To save the nation from the rigged systems, a new 
leader is needed. 
4.3 Enter the Savior 
After outing and condemning the false prophets of America's ruling elites, Trump enters 
the third stage of the jeremiad, where he offers himself to the nation as the new, worthy 
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leader: "I’m the only one — believe me, I know them all, I’m the only one who knows 
how to fix it" (Foreign Policy). Trump understands the importance of the status anxiety 
experienced by white working-class Americans, which is driven by demographic trends 
that see whites becoming a majority-minority by 2050 and the country's perceived 
international decline. Promising "a New American Future [where] we will respect the 
dignity of all Americans – and that means great jobs, great schools, and great 
neighborhoods (Greenville, NC, Sept. 6, 2016)," Trump appeals to both the patriotism 
of his voters and their growing sense of economic resentment. The word 'dignity' 
becomes a central element of Trump's appeal to those who feel left behind by the rapid 
changes of a global, post-industrial society and who feel ignored by, disconnected from, 
and even ridiculed by the nation's white elites. 
Inserting an autobiographical element typical of the jeremiad, Trump refers to 
his father, saying, "It's because of him that I learned, from my youngest age, to respect 
the dignity of work and the dignity of working people. He was a guy most comfortable 
in the company of bricklayers, carpenters, and electricians and I have a lot of that in me 
also. I love those people" (Nomination Acceptance). By talking about people who can 
"fix an engine or […] can build a wall" (First 100 Days), Trump suggests to his voters 
that he is one of them, that he—a billionaire from New York City—understands their 
economic woes. 
The rejection of globalization plays a central role in Trump's scapegoating and 
victimization strategies. He repeatedly refers to an "ideology of globalism that makes 
them rich while shipping your jobs, your factories, and your wealth to other countries" 
(Roanoke, VA, Sept. 24, 2016) to establish a binary us-vs.-them logic, in which the 
alliances of the two presidential candidates are clear. "Hillary Clinton," claims Trump, 
"believes in globalism – taking jobs from Flint and moving them to other countries. I 
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am not running to be President of the world – I am running to be President of the United 
States. I am running to bring hope to Flint, to Canton, and to every party of this 
country" (Canton, OH, Sept. 14, 2016).  
Trump's economic nationalism connects well with the patriotic self-image of 
many white working-class (see Williams 2016). His answer to the globalism of Hillary 
Clinton and her elitist supporters is as simple as unsurprising, it is "Americanism." 
Our country lost its way when we stopped putting the American people first. We 
got here because we switched from a policy of Americanism – focusing on what's 
good for America's middle class – to a policy of globalism, focusing on how to 
make money for large corporations who can move their wealth and workers to 
foreign countries all to the detriment of the American worker and the American 
economy. (SoHo) 
The appeal to voters who feel left behind economically is of course not a new 
phenomenon in American political discourse and is indeed a cornerstone of the 
jeremiad. Both Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, for example, applied these strategies 
successfully to secure the votes of white swing voters (see Austermuehl 2002). The 
difference, however, between Reagan and Clinton on the one hand and Trump on the 
other hand was that the latter applied a rigid zero-sum logic and used unparalleled 
xenophobic and racist language to create two segregated groups fighting over limited 
economic and cultural resources. 
It is also important to note that the plight of the white working class that is the 
dominant topic of Trump's campaign is not an entirely fictitious description. White 
working-class Americans have experienced a steep economic decline symbolized by 
increased mortality rates among white working-class Americans resulting from what 
Case and Deaton (2020) refer to as "deaths of despair." "I hear so many stories and 
pleas, from women especially, about drug addiction and opioid use," says Trump, and 
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then immediately links the opioid epidemic, which has domestic origins and is fueled by 
both domestic and foreign sources, to illegal immigration and smuggling from Mexico: 
"We lose thousands of our fellow Americans every year to opioid use. I will stop the 
drug inflow from our borders. These drugs come over the border and make their way 
into our urban and rural communities, and into our suburbs" (Chester Township, PA, 
Sept. 22, 2016). 
On the campaign trail, Trump consistently presents himself as a successful, self-
made businessman. His attire is always the business suit and the power tie, never the 
checkered shirt, duck-hunting vest, or barn jacket that are so popular among many male 
political candidates in the United States. His dress symbolizes economic success, and 
the independence that comes with it—"I don't need anybody's money. […] I'm really 
rich" (Candidacy)—appeals directly to white working-class Americans. In this context, 
it does not really matter how Trump became successful. The important part is that his 
biography allows him to present himself as the embodiment of the American Dream, an 
element without which the jeremiad would lose much of its discursive power.  
Similarly, in the logic of the jeremiad, the prophet has to show that he is a 
political outsider. Here, again, Trump uses his biography well, saying on numerous 
occasions, "I'm not a politician," adding, "[I] never wanted to be a politician, believe 
me. But, when I saw the trouble our country was in I knew I couldn't stand by and 
watch any longer." In the fashion of George Washington, Trump takes on the time-
tested role of the American Cincinnatus who only reluctantly answered the call to run: 
"I didn't have to do this, believe me. There's nothing easy about it but I had to do it. I 
love our country" (Gettysburg). Trump also makes full use of the masculinity of the 
jeremiad, portraying himself as the strong, male protector of America's forgotten 
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majority, saying: "I have joined the political arena so that the powerful can no longer 
beat up on people that cannot defend themselves" (Nomination Acceptance). 
Trump's open animosity towards the establishment of the Republican Party 
further helped to cement his status of a political outsider. As Reicher and Haslam 
explain, "his failure to follow the rules of politics and his rejection by the political class 
validated his in-group status in the eyes of an antipolitical audience. Supporters 
confirmed that he is "one of us," not "one of them" (2017, 15).  
Trump's in-group credentials are closely linked to his use of politically incorrect 
language. In the eyes and ears of his supporters, Trump simply "tells it like it is." As a 
candidate, for example, Trump tweeted: "So many 'politically correct' fools in our 
country. We have to all get back to work and stop wasting time and energy on 
nonsense!" (Trump 2015). Plain language use is seen as evidence of Trump's 
authenticity. 
As mentioned above, Trump consistently refers to the dignity of American 
workers and the lack of respect for them, and the United States in general. According to 
Williams, this strongly appealed to those American who "feel disrespected, and [who] 
wanted someone to reflect that and to channel that anger and to channel that sense of 
disenfranchisement" (Williams 2016). For many white voters, Trump's show of respect 
was crucial. They were fed up with being told by Barack Obama that "they get bitter, 
they cling to guns or religion" (Seelye and Zelenyapril 2008) or called "a basket of 
deplorables" by Hillary Clinton (Chozick 2016), and they could not care less if Trump 
pronounces Tanzania like Tasmania or if he calls Namibia Nambia. For them, what 





Despite its doomsday narrative, the jeremiad is a positive genre—"a litany of hope," as 
Sacvan Bercovitch (2012, 11) calls it. In the final stage, the prophet always promises his 
people a better future, but only if they vote for him. However, beyond the promise of 
making America safe, rich, and great again, Trump does not offer any more details 
about his vision for the country's better future.  
This is where Trump's discourse is again different. While he made full use of the 
many different facets of the jeremiad—composing a powerful narrative of sin, fear, and 
absolution, scapegoating not only the current Democratic opposition but the entire 
political and media elite of the country, and presenting himself as the masculine 
embodiment of the American dream and as the only possible savior of the nation—he 
never developed a positive vision of post-election America. While, for example, Bill 
Clinton's Jeremiah was if not a happy one, then at least a positive one who provided 
hope and a positive vision for the country's future, Trump's discourse is without hope, 
without light. His speeches are fixed on, and fixated with, the dark side of the jeremiad. 
In his discourse, the inherently hopeful nature of the jeremiad turns into a horror story, 
and instead of the promise of the Fisher King's fertile lands, Trump's first speech as 
president focuses on "mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities; 
rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our Nation; an 
education system, flush with cash […]. This American carnage" (Inaugural Address). 
American presidents are often referred to as the high priests of America's civil 
religion (see, e.g., Bellah 1975). Trump, however, never made the transition from 
prophet to priest—he never even tried to—but instead stayed in permanent campaign 
mode (see Blumenthal 1982). His first speech as president was the first speech of the 
2020 general election campaign, and he has not stopped since. 
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5 Conclusion 
According to a much publicized 2008 report by the U.S. Census Bureau, Americans 
who self-identify as white and non-Hispanic will no longer represent the majority of the 
U.S. population by the year 2050. The same report suggested that as early as  
2020, more non-white children than white children will be born in the United States. 
This trend is seen as the main reason for increased white identity politics and, as a 
consequence, "many whites now view themselves as an embattled and even 
disadvantaged group, and this has led to both strong ingroup identity and a greater 
tolerance for expressions of hostility toward outgroups" (Valentino, Neuner, and 
Vandenbroek 2016, 25). 
Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek (2016, 25) suggest that this greater 
"tolerance for hostile racial rhetoric" precedes the Trump campaign and must rather be 
seen as a reaction to the election in 2008 of Barack Obama, which "may have ironically 
provided at least some whites with the perceived moral license to express more critical 
attitudes about minorities." They argue that "many racial conservatives may notice 
racially insensitive content, yet do not feel angry or disgusted by it. One reason may be 
that many feel we have become too sensitive when discussing race." Trump's uncivil 
discourse and his deliberately politically incorrect actions both exploited and fueled 
these sentiments, and there is little reason to assume that he will change tactics for the 
2020 presidential election.  
A large number of whites continue to feel that their heartland is threatened by 
the above mentioned demographic trends and the growing diversity of the nation. As 
Creech writes, the notion of the heartland represents "a source of American democratic 
character that is discursively linked to predominately White communities buoyed by the 
economic benefits of a post-WWII industrialization" (2018, 6). The idea of the 
heartland "links the economic prosperity of the White working class to the expressions 
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of American identity" (ibid.). Rydgren, building on Taggart (2000), highlights the 
populist dimension of the heartland concept. According to Rydgren, "populist ideology 
tends to build on an idealized image of a chosen people that is located in a similarly 
idealized landscape" (2017, 488).  
This idea is of course central to the logic of the jeremiad, in which the new 
prophet leads the chosen people back to a heartland restored to its former glory. The 
jeremiad is a nostalgic genre. It longs for an idealized past, which is characterized by a 
"homogeneous and genuine way of life" (Rydgren 2017, 488). The American heartland 
of the past, and that of Trump's speeches, is one where sameness dominates over 
diversity. Being 'same' is a prerequisite for being part of the chosen people. As Rydgren 
further explains, "the people inhabiting this imagined heartland constitute 'the people' of 
populist ideology and rhetoric; those who did not belong to the people of the heartland 
of the past do not belong to 'the people' of today, either" (2017, 488). 
The boundaries between "white working-class Americans–particularly toward 
groups to which they hold themselves superior, such as undocumented immigrants" 
(Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado 2017, S162) continue to exist, and Trump continues 
to create fear among the voters who secured his win in 2016, which the Washington 
Post comment upon as follows: "After years of an expansive view of America and what 
it means to be American and pursue the American dream, the president of the United 
States is determined to carry the water of those who believe this nation is a white nation 
for white people" (Capehart 2017).  
The 2020 election is Trump's to lose. Since 1948, sitting presidents were ousted 
only three times on eleven occasions. The three presidents preceding Trump where all 
re-elected with significant margins. With few demographic changes, voter motivation 
and turnout will again be the Holy Grail of the 2020 election. In 2016, Trump found a 
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winning discursive formula that combined economic nationalism with strong racist, 
xenophobic, and misogynist ethno-nativist appeals to a clearly demarcated in-group of 
American voters. His verbal behavior during his first three years in office provides no 
reason at all to think that he will not again apply the normalization strategies discussed 
in this article. 
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Sub-corpus 1 
Remarks Announcing Candidacy for President in New York City, June 16, 2015 
(Announcement) 
Remarks on Foreign Policy in Washington, DC, Apr. 27, 2016 (Foreign Policy) 
Remarks at Trump SoHo in New York City, June 22, 2016 (SoHo) 
Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention 
in Cleveland, OH, July 21, 2016 (Nomination Acceptance) 
Remarks on Immigration at the Phoenix Convention Center in Phoenix, AZ, Aug. 31 
2016 (Immigration) 
Remarks at the South Florida Fair Expo Center in West Palm Beach, FL, Oct. 13 2016 
(West Palm Beach) 
Remarks on Proposals for the First 100 Days in Office, Gettysburg PA, Oct. 22 2016 
(First 100 Days) 
Remarks in New York City Accepting Election as 45th President, Nov. 9 2016 
(Victory) 
Inaugural Address, Washington, DC, Jan. 20, 2017 (Inaugural) 
7.2 Sub-corpus 2 
Remarks Announcing Candidacy for President in New York City, June 16, 2015 
Remarks at the AIPAC Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 21, 2016 
Remarks on Foreign Policy in Washington, DC, Apr. 27, 2016  
Remarks at Saint Anselm College in Manchester, New Hampshire, June 13, 2016 
Remarks at Trump SoHo in New York City 
Remarks in Virginia Beach, Virginia, July 11, 2016 
Remarks Introducing Governor Mike Pence as the 2016 Republican Vice Presidential 
Nominee in New York City, July 16, 2016 
Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention 
in Cleveland, Ohio, July 21, 2016 
News Conference in Doral, Florida, July 27, 2016 
Remarks at the KI Convention Center in Green Bay, Wisconsin, Aug. 5, 2016 
Remarks to the Detroit Economic Club, Michigan, Aug. 8, 2016 
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Remarks at a Rally at the University of North Carolina in Wilmington, Aug. 9, 2016 
Remarks at Erie Insurance Arena in Erie, Pennsylvania, Aug. 12, 2016 
Remarks at Youngstown State University in Youngstown, Ohio, Aug. 15, 2016 
Remarks at the Washington County Fair Park in West Bend, Wisconsin, Aug. 16 2016 
Remarks at the Charlotte Convention Center in Charlotte, North Carolina, Aug. 18 2016 
Remarks at the Summit Sports and Ice Complex in Dimondale, Michigan, Aug. 19 2016 
Remarks at Luedecke Arena in Austin, Texas, Aug. 23 2016 
Remarks at the Mississippi Coliseum in Jackson, Mississippi, Aug. 24 2016 
Remarks at the XFinity Arena in Everett, Washington, Aug. 30 2016 
Remarks on Immigration at the Phoenix Convention Center Phoenix, Arizona, Aug. 31 
2016 
Remarks to the American Legion in Cincinnati, Ohio, Sept. 1 2016 
Remarks at the Roberts Centre in Wilmington, Ohio, Sept. 1 2016 
Remarks at Great Faith International Ministries in Detroit, Michigan, Sept. 3 2016 
Remarks at a Rally Greenville Convention Center Greenville North Carolina, Sept. 6 
2016 
Remarks at the Union League of Philadelphia in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Sept. 7 
2016 
Remarks at the Cleveland Arts and Social Sciences Academy, Ohio, Sept. 8 2016 
Remarks to the 11th Annual Values Voter Summit in Washington, DC, Sept. 9 2016 
Remarks at a Rally at the Pensacola Bay Center in Pensacola, Florida, Sept. 9 2016 
Remarks at the US Cellular Center in Asheville, North Carolina, Sept. 12 2016 
Address to the National Guard Association Baltimore, Maryland, Sept. 12 2016 
Remarks at Aston Community Center in Aston, Pennsylvania, Sept. 13 2016 
Remarks at Seven Flags Event Center in Des Moines, Iowa, Sept. 13 2016 
Remarks at a Rally at Canton Memorial Civic Center Canton, Ohio, Sept. 14 2016 
Remarks to the Economic Club of New York at the Waldorf Astoria, Sept. 15 2016 
Remarks at a Rally at the James L. Knight Center Miami, Florida, Sept. 16 2016 
Remarks at the Remembrance Project Luncheon Omni Houston Hotel, Texas, Sept. 17 
2016 
Remarks at High Point University in High Point, North Carolina, Sept. 20 2016 
Remarks at a Rally at Sun Center Studios Chester Township, Pennsylvania, Sept. 22 
2016 
Remarks at the Shale Insight TM Conference Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Sept. 22 2016 
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Remarks at a Rally at Berglund Center in Roanoke, Virginia, Sept. 24 2016 
Remarks at a Rally at the Mid-America Center in Council Bluffs, Iowa, Sept. 28, 2016 
Remarks at a Rally in Bedford, New Hampshire, Sept. 29 2016 
Remarks at the Suburban Collection Showplace in Novi, Michigan, Sept. 30 2016 
Remarks at the Pueblo Convention Center in Pueblo, Colorado, Oct. 3 2016 
Remarks at the Budweiser Events Center in Loveland, Colorado, Oct. 3 2016 
Remarks at Prescott Valley Event Center in Prescott Valley, Arizona, Oct. 4 2016 
Remarks at Henderson Pavilion in Henderson, Nevada, Oct. 5 2016 
Remarks at the Reno-Sparks Convention Center in Reno, Nevada, Oct. 5 2016 
Excerpts of Remarks at Aaron Bessant Park in Panama City, Florida, Oct. 11 2016 
Remarks at the Southeastern Livestock Pavilion in Ocala, Florida, Oct. 12 2016 
Remarks at the Renaissance Hotel in Columbus, Ohio, Oct. 13 2016 
Remarks at the South Florida Fair Expo Center West Palm Beach, Florida, Oct. 13 2016 
Remarks at the Cross Insurance Center in Bangor, Maine, Oct. 15 2016 
Remarks at Toyota of Portsmouth in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Oct. 15 2016 
Remarks at the KI Convention Center in Green Bay, Wisconsin, Oct. 17 2016 
Remarks at the Norris-Penrose Event Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado, Oct. 18 
2016 
Remarks at the Delaware County Fairgrounds in Delaware, Ohio, Oct. 20 2016 
Remarks at the Davis Event Center in Fletcher, North Carolina, Oct. 21 2016 
Remarks at the Newtown Athletic Club Newtown, Pennsylvania, Oct. 21 2016 
Remarks on Proposals for the First 100 Days in Office, Pennsylvania, Oct. 22 2016 
Remarks at the Collier County Fairgrounds in Naples, Florida, Oct. 23 2016 
Remarks at McGlohon Theatre in Charlotte, North Carolina, Oct. 26 2016 
Remarks at the Champions Center Expo in Springfield, Ohio, Oct. 27 2016 
Remarks at Radisson Armory in Manchester, New Hampshire, Oct. 28 2016 
Remarks at the Jeffco Fairgrounds Event Center in Golden, Colorado, Oct. 29 2016 
Remarks at the Phoenix Convention Center in Phoenix, Arizona, Oct. 29 2016 
Remarks at Macomb Community College Warren, Michigan, Oct. 31 2016 
Remarks on Obamacare in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, Nov. 1 2016 
Remarks at the Central Florida Fairgrounds in Orlando, Florida, Nov. 2 2016 
Remarks at the Bayfront Park Amphitheater in Miami, Florida Nov 2. 2016 
Remarks at J.S Dorton Arena in Raleigh, North Carolina, Nov. 7 2016 
Remarks in New York City Accepting Election as 45th President, Nov. 9 2016 
